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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAMIE NUNNELLEY, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
LEWIS L. RIGBY, et al., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL SA V-
INGS & LOAN ASSN., et al., 
Respondents. 
No. 6657 
On page 3 of their brief counsel quote from the 
opinion a few lines on receivership, and, overlooking the 
fact that the court is referring to a receiver that might 
be appointed by the state court, imply that the Federal 
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Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation might be such 
receiver. 
Reference to 12 U. S. C . .A., sec. 1729 (c), will 
disclose that it is only for insured institutions other than 
Federal Savings and Loan .Associations that the serv-
ices of such insurance corporation are available to 
courts. .And it seems from 12 U. S. C . .A., sec. 1464, 
that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board only can 
appoint such corporation as receiver of a Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association. 
Is it conceivable that the courts of Utah having un-
doubted jurisdiction of the merits are powerless to ad-
nlinister equity in these cases~ 
Counsel's attempt to distinguish Coleman v. 
Barnes, 5 .Allen (Mass.) 374, strikes us as being rather 
lame. There the Court permitted the joinder of plain-
tiffs because of the common interest of the plaintiffs in 
the goods available to liquidate their several claims, and 
it required an equitable re1nedy to furnish the relief 
that was due and was sought . 
.Again counsel cite Spear vs. Green (Mass.) 140 N. E. 
795. That case did not turn on the question of misjoin-
der of plaintiffs. There, there were seven different 
groups embracing forty plaintiffs having several inter-
ests in three distinct corporate defendants, and there 
was no "common relationship to a definite wrong." 
There was a clear misjoinder of causes of action. There 
'vas no single class that might have been represented, 
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and the holding was that a representative class suit was 
not n1aintainable. 
In Brown vs. vVerblin, et al., 244 N. Y. S. 209, there 
was no question as to a Inisjoinder of parties plaintiff, 
and could not have been, because there was only one 
plaintiff. The court held that the legal remedy was 
adequate and that plaintiff stated no cause of action in 
equity. The plaintiff sought to Inaintain the suit as a 
representative or class suit, but the complaint failed to 
show that the person she sought to represent was 
himself interested in any common fund. 
The case is so absolutely wanting in appositeness 
that we never heretofore in our briefs even referred to it. 
Again is cited Ballew Lumber & Hardware Com-
pany, et al., vs. ~L P. Railway Co. (~fo.) 232 S. W. 1015. 
That case apparently is against our contention. The 
l\Iissouri Court relies on but misstates completely the 
facts in the case of Tribette, et al, vs. Illinois Central 
Power Con1pany, 70 :Miss. 182, 12 So. 32, which case 
holds that the Railroad Company could not enjoin a 
number of persons from severally prosecuting their sev-
eral actions at law for damages arising fron1 a single 
fire. 
But the ~fississippi Court did say that where each of 
several plaintiffs could proceed in eq1tity, "their joinder 
as plaintiffs or defendants in one suit is not objection-
able.'' 
'Vhile the 1fissouri Court refused to apply such 
principle, it treats the 1vlississippi Court's holding that 
the injured persons could not have joined even if they 
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had tried to do so (which they did not) in a pure actwu 
at law, as a precedent for the holding of the Missouri 
Court that the plaintiffs in Missouri could not join 
in equity to establish and enforce a trust. The case 
stands almost alone. 
Note also that Missouri is one of the very few code 
states that never enacted the statute relating to parties 
where they are very numerous, and where there is a 
common interest in the same questions. This matter is 
referred to in Fourth Edition, Pomeroy Code Remedies, 
page 173. Mr. Pomeroy criticises the failur~ of the 
1\Hssouri Courts to give effect to the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
Rural Credit Subscribers' Assn. vs. J ett, 205 Ky. 
603, 266 S. W. 240, is again cited. In that case many 
persons attempted to join as plaintiffs and to maintain 
a class suit for others. The Court first held (and con-
trary to what has been held in this case against the re-
spondents) that the several plaintiffs had each a mere 
cause of action at law and hence could not join. There 
was no common tie or equity. among them. There was 
no common or insufficient fund. There was joined with 
the plaintiffs' suit against the corporation a pure deriva-
tive suit in right of the corporation. (The suit to set 
aside the permanent transfers to Colonial Corporation 
is not deriveative.) 
The Court there held that the plaintiffs' causes of 
action were at law and the other and derivative cause 
of action was in equity, and so there was a misjoinder 
of causes of action. In Kentucky, unlike Utah, equitable 
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and legal actions cannot be joined in the smne suit. 
See Kentucky Civil Code of Practice, Sections 5, 
6, 8, 83. 
But as we have heretofore in other briefs pointed 
out, Kentucky has held both ways n1any times on the 
question of joinder of plaintiffs. 
Lile v. Kefauver, et al, 51 S. ,V. Rd. 473, is again 
clie~ and counsel say: 
''Insolvency and necessity of prorating 
clain1s were elements.'' 
Insolvency was 1wt an element; that is to say, no 
insolvency of any defendant was alleged. The bank, of 
which plaintiffs had been depositors, was insolvent, but 
it was not a party to the action. There was no claim 
that any of the defendants were insolvent and there was 
no suggestion or allegation touching any necessity to 
prorate any loss. 
Counsel adniit that Black, et al, vs. Simpson (South 
Carolina), 77 S. E. 1023, lends support to our contention 
as to joinder of plaintiffs, but counsel say that two of 
the five judges dissented. It is true that the majority 
found but little in the way of a common tie, but they did 
assert a common equity in the fact that the defendant 
there was a fiduciary of all the plaintiffs and that they 
were entitled to an accounting. 
The dissenting judges did not refer to such mat-
ter and evidently thought that the fiduciary relation was 
an insufficient bond or tie. The dissenting opinion 
says: 
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''This is not a case in which there was a 
fraudulent sale of the property of the corpora-
tion where the same act necessarily affected all.'' 
''I do not see a single bond of union.'' 
''The complaint does not even allege that 
the defendant now has the proceeds of sale, and 
the plaintiffs are entitled to share in the fund." 
Thus the dissenting opinion in its implications as 
applied to the facts of this case is favorable to us. 
Again counsel refer to Stewart, et al, vs. Ficken, 
et al, (South Carolina), 149 S. E. 164, and they intin1ate, 
this being a later case, that such weakens or overrules 
the Black case. 
In the Stewart case: 
"The basis of the complaint is that by cul-
pable mismanagement of the affairs of the bank 
by the directors' defendants, its assets have been 
wasted, producing the failure and loss.'' 
The Court then proceeded to hold, and correctly, 
that the depositor plaintiffs did not own the cause of 
action so arising, but that it belonged to the bank, and 
also held that the several depositors could not join as 
plaintiffs to recover their several deposits. There was 
no matter of a common fund, no matter of a necessity 
to prorate losses, no matter of fraudulent conveyance of 
property to the injury of plaintiffs, or any other matter 
of equity tending to tie or unite the plaintiffs. 
Then, as to the matter of joinder of the particular 
two plaintiffs, the Court cites Fant vs. Brissey, 143 
S. C. 264, 141 S. E. 450, a case involving the simple 
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principle that where there is no com1non equity, two or 
more persons injured by the same tort cannot join. 
Apparently counsel fail to get our point based on 
the U nifonn Fraudulent Conveyance Act. vV e tried to 
point out that such Act sin1ply ren1oves the former re-
quireinent that a creditor or creditors had to have judg-
ments before they could sue to set aside a fraudulent 
conveyance, and we showed that fonnerly any number 
of creditors could join in such a suit, and the conclusion 
i~ inevitable that nonjudg1nent creditors could now join 
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. 
Counsel now say that our contention would lead to 
the result that all personal injury plaintiffs separately 
injured could have all of their cases tried in the same 
action. To say the least, this seen1s to be rather far-
fetched. 
However, if there were a number of personal injury 
plaintiffs having claims aggregating say a half million 
dollars, against an insolvent railroad company, which, 
however, was able to pay a substantial portion of the 
damage, but not all, we should not hesitate to claim that 
such situation would present a case for a proper joinder 
in equity. 
Or if there were a number of plaintiffs having such 
claims against a railroad company which had rendered 
itself insolvent bv a fraudulent conveyance of its assets, 
. . 
we should not hesitate to say that they Inight join and 
have in one suit full equitable and legal relief. 
Counsel, to our minds, have failed to discriminate 
between a pure derivative snit in right of a corporation 
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and a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. Our 
suit here as against the Colonial Corporation is not in 
the nature of a stockholders' suit in right of a corpora-
tion and is in no sense derivative. 
An investing certificate holder stands more in the 
relation of a creditor than as a stockholder of an ordi-
nary corporation. 
And ''the statute protects all just and lawful ac-
tions, etc., whether the demand is one sounding in dam-
ages or arising under a contract.'' 
Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances, 3rd ed. 502.3. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. L. HEDRICK, 
E. A. WALTON, 
PARNELL BLACK, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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